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Abstract
Today, industrial maintenance is organized as an
on-call business: Upon a customer’s service request, the
maintenance provider schedules a service technician to
perform the demanded service at a suitable time. In this
work, we address two drawbacks of this scheduling
approach: First, the provider typically prioritizes
service demand based on a subjective perception of
urgency. Second, the pricing of technician services is
inefficient, since services are priced on a time and
material basis without accounting for additional service
quality (e.g. shorter response time).
We propose the implementation of a technician
marketplace that allows customers to book technician
capacity for fixed time slots. The price per time slot
depends on the remaining capacity and therefore
incentivizes customers to claim slots that match their
objective task urgency.
The approach is evaluated using a simulation study.
Results show the capabilities of capacity-based pricing
mechanisms to prioritize service demand according to
customers’ opportunity costs.

1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Industrial maintenance—often being outsourced—is
still the backbone of the industrial service business
today. When industrial machinery needs to be
maintained, repaired, or overhauled, customers (the
manufacturers operating the machine) request a
maintenance job from a service provider. The provider
performs the service at a suitable time and prices it
according to a specific pricing approach: the most
common ones being “time and material spent” or
according to a “long-term maintenance contract”.
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Recently, the perception of industrial maintenance
has changed. Having been considered as a “necessary
evil” in the past, efficient maintenance is now seen as a
competitive advantage [1], as maintenance costs
account for around 28% of total production costs [2].
Due to this perception, maintenance providers are in
need for competitive service delivery, of which the
performance is greatly influenced by an efficient
scheduling of jobs. That is, providers need to correctly
allocate spatially distributed tasks to spatially
distributed technicians. The process of allocating tasks
to technicians is subject to many constraints, for
example, the consideration of skills, customers’ and
technicians’ locations, and, very important, by the
priority of the service demand. This task of allocating
service demand to technicians is called dispatching and
typically performed by human dispatchers.

1.2 Problem
Objective

Formulation

and

Research

Today, the dispatching of industrial maintenance
underlies two major drawbacks:
First, dispatchers do not follow clear rules on how to
prioritize service demand in times of technician shortage
(i.e. situations during which the urgent demand cannot
be met with the available technician capacity). One
prominent approach for dealing with this problem is to
prioritize tasks based on the first-come-first-serve
(FCFS) principle. Thus, requests are prioritized
according to their time of arrival. Another common
approach is to prioritize requests based on customer
segments: customers who pay a periodic fee to receive
higher service request are prioritized over regular
customers. In practice, those customers are often
referred to as premium customers. Our findings from
practice, however, do not support the correct application
of prioritization methods. Often, prioritization does not
follow clear rules, as it is highly influenced by human
opinion. For example, customers causing the highest
trouble (e.g. by often calling the service provider) are
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prioritized just because they indicate urgency and claim
high priority. To address such problems, there is a need
to develop an objective and transparent prioritization
method for field technician scheduling.
Second, pricing of maintenance services typically
follows a cost-plus pricing mechanism. This means that
service providers set prices according to their costs with
an additional margin for their profit.
The impact of these two drawbacks can easily be
shown with a simple example: There are three broken
machines that are in need for an urgent repair (i.e.
service demand). One machine (customer A) is operated
in an advanced just-in-time production system and its
downtime results in the shutdown of the entire
production line. The second and third machines
(customers B & C) are part of flexible production
systems in which a short machine failure can be
compensated (e.g. by the usage of buffers). Given those
three cases, it is highly likely that customers have
varying willingness to pay (WTP) for an immediate
repair as indicated in Figure 1. Today, those three
machines would be treated equally and the dispatcher
decides which machine would be served first. Therefore,
prioritization is not done under consideration of the
WTP of the customer (and therefore the real urgency of
the task). Second, as shown in Figure 1, the single
service price allows customers to realize a high
consumer surplus (grey area). This is a known issue for
cost-plus pricing in scenarios in which providers face
high fixed and low variable costs [3].

customer A
service price

customer B

customer C

consumer surplus

Figure 1: Customer Surplus
The objectives of this work are two-fold: First, we
aim to develop a pricing strategy that results in objective
task prioritization by allowing customers to self-signal
their task urgency through their WTP. Second, we
propose a more efficient market solution by pricing
maintenance services based on the added value created
for the customer. Hence, the developed solution
simultaneously increases provider’s revenue and results

in objective task prioritization by exploiting customer’s
signaling effects.

2. Fundamentals and Related Work
In this section, we first introduce fundamentals of
industrial maintenance. Second, we give an overview on
field agent scheduling, before, third, introducing field
agent scheduling. Fourth, we introduce relevant
literature on pricing of industrial services, before,
finally, introducing research on the estimation of costs
of downtime.

2.1 Fundamentals of Industrial Maintenance
Manufacturers of industrial machinery commonly
support their customers with supplementary
maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) services.
Geraerds [4] defines these services as ''[...] all activities
aimed at keeping an item in or restoring it to the physical
state considering necessary for the fulfilment of its
production function''. Service in the context of industrial
maintenance can further be categorized as (a) plannable,
preventive services (e.g. machine installations, periodic
maintenance, overhaul), and (b) unplannable, corrective
services (e.g. breakdown). Manufacturing companies
generally provide these services through distributed
field service technicians. The efficient utilization of
their limited capacity is an important success factor for
their service departments [5].
The process of industrial maintenance is
traditionally structured as follows: Once a machine
requires service the customer manually opens a service
request. Thereafter, the service provider tries to identify
the required service activities to be performed which
approximately determines the priority of the task
(relatively to all other unfulfilled requests), the expected
service duration and the required technician
qualifications. When this information is known, the task
is handed over to dispatchers. Dispatchers assign
spatially distributed service demand to spatially
distributed field technicians. This is a highly complex
task and will be further explained in the next section.
Once assigned, the task service is delivered.
Traditionally, such services are priced based on their
required time and material spent. Recently, however,
customers increasingly demand agreements that are
closer aligned with their needs [6]. Examples of such
long-term engagements are full-service (e.g. [7], [8]),
availability- (e.g. [9], [10]), or performance- (e.g. [11],
[12]) based maintenance contracts. The contracted
service levels of such agreements can theoretically act
as a proxy to prioritize the service demand of customers
in the dispatching process. However, expert interviews
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have shown a poor consideration of those requirements
in day-to-day dispatching decisions. Therefore,
generally customers pay standardized prices
disregarding individual circumstances [7].

2.2 Field Service Scheduling
Dispatching is not limited to industrial maintenance,
as other industries have similar problems (e.g.
transportation in health care, telecommunication
technician services, etc.). However, each industry
introduces its own characteristics. Whereas some
industries rely on highly automated dispatching
systems, dispatching in industrial maintenance is often
done by human dispatchers with little technical support.
Dispatching is done under consideration of multiple
constraints. For example, dispatchers must consider
technician skills, task priority, routing, and working
times during decision making. In addition, industrial
maintenance underlies much uncertainty. First,
maintenance providers do not know future service
demand. Second, even if they are aware of a service
task, they cannot predict their duration exactly. In
practice, dispatchers have different strategies to deal
with uncertainty, most of them being based on
individual experience.
Field service scheduling is explored in a variety of
interconnected research fields. The domain of
operations research focuses on algorithmically solving
vehicle routing problems—a superset of field service
planning. Based on a literature review of peer-reviewed
taxonomies, Vössing [13] provides an overview of the
many facets of vehicle routing problems addressed in
the operations research domain. Additionally, he
outlines how the complex, dynamic, and stochastic realworld field service planning motivates the need for
novel planning approaches.
Obviously, both the transactional process and the
established business models of industrial maintenance
highly limits the short-term flexibility ideally required
to quickly response to urgent customer requests. This is
further complicated as dispatchers simultaneously
pursue two contradictory goals: high technician
utilization and flexible capacity for short-term service
demand. Today, many dispatchers apply individual,
loosely defined dispatching strategies. Even though
scheduling algorithms are available, most dispatchers
follow simple strategies as outlined by Hill [14].
Especially the prioritization of service requests has little
guidelines and oversight, therefore many companies can
improve their dispatching processes with advanced
prioritization concepts.

2.3 Pricing Strategies for Industrial Services
Previous research has shown that industrial service
pricing is more challenging than the pricing of industrial
products [15].
Three main dimensions of pricing are traditionally
researched in the literature. First, pricing objectives (e.g.
maximize profit or maximize market shares) that define
the provider’s pricing goals. Second, pricing methods
(e.g. cost-, competition-, and value-based pricing
approaches) that describe the logic how prices are being
determined. Third, pricing policies (e.g. list prices,
differentiated pricing, or yield management) that define
the way prices are presented to the customer.
A literature review by Avlonitis and Indounas [16]
shows that most industrial services are priced based on
the cost-plus (cost-based pricing) or the market-based
(competition-based pricing) approach. Further studies in
industrial pricing include contributions on the success of
service pricing companies and their pricing approaches
[17], and in which environment industrial service
providers adopt pricing policies, such as skimming,
penetration, and competitive pricing [18]. Finally,
Indounas [19] analyzes how the choice of a pricing
strategy influences industrial service provider’s
performance.

2.4 Costs of Downtime
Around 80% of industrial companies are unable to
accurately predict their cost of downtime. Usually,
enterprises underestimate their costs significantly such
that the actual costs of downtime are two to three times
higher than expected [20].
Researchers differentiate between direct and indirect
costs of downtime. Direct costs of downtime are costs
that can directly be associated with the repair of a broken
asset (i.e. time and material spent for repairing the
asset). Indirect downtime costs are consecutive costs of
an asset’s failure due to idle labor force, opportunity
costs due to reduced production quantity, or even
monetarized loss in reputation.
So far, research has focused on determining the costs
of downtime for individual machine failures, as, for
example, in Fox et al. [21] and Vegunta and Milanovic
[22]. In addition, these studies on specific use-cases are
supplemented with a qualitative studiy on how
companies deal with the determination of costs of
downtime [23].
The estimation of downtime costs prior to a machine
failure is only approached by Wolff and Schmitz [24].
Their work presents a model for calculating the costs of
downtime based on production losses for simple
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production systems. They formulate the need of further
research on the estimation of downtime costs.

3. Design of the Marketplace
3.1 Introduction to the Marketplace
This work proposes the concept of a marketplace to
realize both research objectives: The marketplace gives
customers the possibility to book technician capacity for
predetermined time windows. Hence, the marketplace
gives customers complete control about the time at
which field service technicians provide the requested
service. In addition, by using price variations the
marketplace will result in higher revenue for the
provider. The following analysis focuses on the
dispatching of urgent service requests only (i.e.
breakdowns). In addition, we assume that industrial
manufacturers want their equipment repaired as soon as
possible, thus ignoring any additional influence factors.
When maintenance is required, customers can search
for technician capacity on the marketplace. Prior,
customers must state the location the service is required
at, the service duration, and the required skillset.

Figure 2:
Schedules

Exemplary

Current

Technician

At all times, the marketplace holds a valid current
schedule for all technicians, as exemplarily shown in
Figure 2. We see that daily work times are split into a
series of time slots of predetermined length (here 15
minutes). Travel times are denoted by ( T ). As shown,
any technician activity (e.g. travelling, repair) needs to
start and end with time slots but can include a series of
them. If needed, activities are extended to the next time
slot. Hence, in this case, a travel time of 17 minutes
requires two consecutive time slots.
Based on the specified service request of the
customer and the current technician schedules, the
marketplace searches for possible time slots to perform
the service. For example, Figure 2 shows potential times

to perform a requested service of 90 minutes (hence 6
time slots) by the dotted areas. Technician #02 cannot
perform the service, since the additional required travel
times would exceed his available time. Using available
technician capacity, possible service times are identified
that each have a price—but no technician—associated
to them. Here, there are six possible service times—as
shown in Figure 2 in the Possible Service Time i column,
with prices ps,i, i ϵ [1, 2, …, 6] associated to them. As
the service duration is determined by the task to be
performed, possible service times are identified by a
unique start time ts and the price ps associated with it.
The price ps is the price for the service to be performed
at the given time. Hence, the marketplace provides the
customer with the list of possible service times and
associated prices as shown below.
[(ts,1, ps,1), (ts,2, ps,2), …, (ts,n, ps,n)]
For the given example, the possible service times
given to the customer are:
[(08:30, ps,1), (08:45, ps,2), (09:00, ps,3),
(09:15, ps,4), (09:30, ps,5), (09:45, ps,6)]
Once possible services times are transmitted,
customers freely decide at which of the possible service
times the service will be fulfilled. A rational customer
chooses the earliest possible service time that has a price
smaller or equal than his WTP—and as explained
later—therefore minimizes his total costs. Once a
service time is chosen, the marketplace assigns the task
to an available technician for the given time and bills the
customer according to the price associated with that
service time.
Following the above explanation, the marketplace
consists of the following modules: First, the input
module that allows customers to provide required data
for the service request (e.g. service duration, location,
and required skillset). Second, the marketplace has an
algorithm that identifies possible service times for the
required service. Third, the marketplace has a
mechanism to determine prices associated to possible
service times, and, finally, the marketplace needs the
capability to reserve the chosen technician capacity
based on the previously proposed service times.

3.2 Customer’s Willingness to Pay
In this section, we want to explain how the WTP of
a customer can be modelled. For the following, we
assume that customers want their machinery repaired as
soon as possible and act as rational decision makers,
thus try to minimize their own total costs.
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As introduced in the related work section, the
customer faces two cost categories in the case of a
machine breakdown, namely direct and indirect
downtime costs. In this work, we limit direct costs to
labor costs (ignoring other aspects such as material
costs, as they must be paid regardless of service time and
thus, are a fixed add-on that do not influence decision
making) and indirect costs to opportunity costs arising
from reduced production output (lost revenue). From
now on, we refer to direct costs as service costs cs, and
indirect costs to opportunity costs co. Using this
terminology, the total costs ct for a machine breakdown
are calculated as shown below.
𝑐" = 𝑐$ + 𝑐&
The marketplace provides the customer with a set of
possible service times. For each possible service time 𝑖,
the customer calculates the total costs ct,i. The
opportunity costs co,i are determined by the sum of
opportunity costs that are incurred over time until the
machine is fixed. Opportunity costs can be calculated by
fixed costs based on time-units or based on the current
production plan. However, the estimation of opportunity
costs is not part of this work. The service cost cs,i is the
price of the possible service time 𝑖. The determination
of the service costs cs,i is explained in the following
section. The customer now uses the total costs ct,i of the
possible service times to prioritize them according to his
point of view.
Knowing the total costs ct,i for all possible service
times 𝑖, the customer is willing to pay as much as the
price of the possible service time 𝑖 that has the lowest
total costs.

3.3 Pricing of Service Times
Using the marketplace, the provider aims at selling
different services to different customer segments. For
example, customers with high opportunity costs and
customers with medium opportunity costs might both
represent a segment. In this case, the services are
characterized by different response times. Customers
with high opportunity costs are addressed with services
with a short response time, whereas customers with low
opportunity costs are addressed with services with
longer response times. Of course, the services are priced
differently. In other words, the provider aims at selling
a certain amount of capacity to different segments at
different times ahead of time.
As the provider does not know which customer
belongs to which segment, he needs customers to signal
their segment belonging. Customers of the different
segments have different WTPs due to their different

opportunity costs. Hence, it makes sense for the
provider to differentiate segments by the pricing policy.
Using capacity-based pricing mechanisms, the price of
a service depends on the remaining technician capacity
at that time, what means that booking of technician
capacity at peak times is more expensive than the
booking of technician capacity during off-peak times.
Unfortunately, as service times are a series of
consecutive time slots, available technician capacity
does not necessarily remain constant during the entire
service time (see Figure 1: technician availability
changes between 09:00-09:15 and 10:30-10:45).
Therefore, we propose to determine the price of a
possible service time i (ps,i) based on the sum of prices
for the time slots j the possible service is composed of.
Given individual prices pts,j for time slot j, the service
time price for alternative i is calculated as shown below.
𝑝$,* =

𝑝"$,+
+-*

However, we did not explain how the price pts, j of a
time slot j is determined. For individual time slots, we
are able to calculate technician availability. Depending
on the remaining available capacity, the time slot price
pts is either discounted or increased. Those effects are
realized using a base price pb that is multiplied by a
capacity-based factor. The capacity based factor can be
modelled using a function, such that in short, the price
pts,j of time slot j is calculated as shown below.
𝑝"$,+ = 𝑓 𝑐/01,+ , 𝑐+ , … ∗ 𝑝4
Here, cmax,j is the maximum technician capacity
during time slot j and cj represents the remaining
technician capacity during time slot j. If needed, the
pricing function can incorporate additional parameters
as denoted by “…”. 𝑝4 denotes the base price for the
demanded service.
At this point we want to clarify the available
capacity. Available technician capacity is defined as
technician time that can be used to do revenueincreasing tasks, hence that can be used to fulfil
additional service tasks. Therefore, travelling
technicians, even though they are currently not
performing a service task on a customer’s site, are
accounted for as being unavailable. Using Figure 1, for
example, the technician capacity available during the
time slot from 9:00-09:15 is 75%, whereas the time slots
from 10:00-10:15 and 10.15-10:30 both have an
available technician capacity of 50%, even though in the
first one, one technician is marked as travelling.
Relating to the related work on industrial service
pricing, the pricing objective of the proposed approach
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is a higher revenue for the service provider and the task
prioritization by customers based on a monetarized
point of view. The pricing method is value-based, as the
base price pb is oriented on the mean customer added
value by a repair. Adaption to the customer segment is
achieved by the multiplier. Finally, the pricing policy
used on the marketplace, capacity-based pricing, is a
combination of service demand based pricing under the
consideration of customer price.
It is important to note that any customer is still able
to book service capacity at any time desired. However,
the customer needs to have a WTP higher than the
service price demanded. Therefore, the service price ps
is used as an approach of self-segmenting customers in
urgency categories. In addition, the effectiveness of the
pricing function on the desired research objective, the
determination of the real urgency of a task, increases
with the number of segments. Ideally, every customer is
characterized by his own customer segment. However,
it is doubtable that this is practically feasible.

4. Evaluation of the Marketplace
4.1 Methodology
The impact of a technician marketplace is evaluated
using a simulation experiment. From the many
simulation approaches available, discrete event
simulation fits our case best. Activities can be
discretized to certain events, for example, the working
time can be modelled as an event it begins at and as an
event it is finished. In between, the status of neither the
technician, nor the machine changes. The simulation is
1
implemented in Python using the SimPy framework.
Using simulation techniques to evaluate effects of
changes on field service scheduling is a common
approach and has already been applied by multiple
researchers (e.g. [25], [26], [27]). A comprehensive
review of simulation in maintenance (including
scheduling) is given by Alrabghi and Tiwari [28].
The simulation experiment is structured as follows:
There are two scenarios, A and B, that only differ in the
time slot pricing function. Scenario A represents
industrial maintenance as done today under FCFS
dispatching. This means that a repair is scheduled as
soon as possible for a fixed price. Scenario B represents
the industrial maintenance market using a technician
marketplace with a capacity-based price function. The
determination of the pricing function is explained in a
following section.
To achieve higher generalizability of results, both
scenarios are simulated fifteen times, each time having
1

different random seed values (hence introducing new
pseudo-randomness). One simulation run covers an
entire year, during which the first three month are
regarded as settling time and not included in analysis.

4.2 Introduction to the Simulation Model
The simulation consists of manufacturing units that
fail over time. Once failed, the equipment (the
customer) demands available repair times (i.e. possible
service times) along with their prices. As mentioned
before, the customer then decides on the time window
based on rational decision making, hence the time
window minimizing total costs. Prices for time windows
are determined following the defined price function.
Once the repair time window is chosen, the
manufacturing equipment remains broken and is reset
once a technician arrived and completely performed the
repair work. For simplicity, machines are assumed to
work continuously (e.g. three shifts) and that technicians
work from 8:00 until 16:00. All days are assumed to be
normal working days (no bank holidays or weekends).
Table 1: Category’s Opportunity Cost
Distribution Parameters
high
medium
low
5.0
2.0
1.0
µ
1.2
0.5
0.25
s
As introduced before, we assume that different
customers have different WTPs. As the WTP is
influenced by the opportunity costs co of a customer, we
distinguish between three groups of customer categories
during the simulation. First, we have customers that
have low opportunity costs co. Second, and third, we
have customers with medium and high opportunity
costs. The opportunity costs per time slot of a category
follow a normal distribution with the distribution
parameters as shown in Table 1. Those prices may be
interpreted as absolute values or as a factor of the
multiple of a mean opportunity cost over all customers.
To model travel times correctly, the simulation uses
a set L of 5000 locations. For each pair of location o, j ϵ
L and o ¹ j, we determined a random and symmetric
travel time. The travel times (in minutes) between each
pair o, j ϵ L follow a N(60, 15) distribution.
Additionally, the parameters shown in Table 2 were
used for the simulation model. The number of machines
and technicians are chosen such that—assuming the
given mean time until failure after repair and around two
tasks performed per technician per day—the technician
capacity is sufficient to perform the total service

https://simpy.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
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demand. The mean time until failure after repair of
machines follows an exponential distribution with a
mean value of 28 days. The lead selling time, set to four
days, is the time horizon that technician capacity can be
booked ahead in time. Finally, the repair duration is set
to two hours and 30 minutes, technicians work for eight
hours a day and a time slot has a duration of 15 minutes.
Table 2: Simulation Parameters
Parameter
Value
10
number of technicians
500
number of machines
mean time to failure after ~ exp(l) with l = 28
days
repair
4 days
lead selling time
2 hours 30 minutes
repair duration
8 hours
working day length
15 minutes
time slot duration
The simulation model includes the following
simplifications: First, according to the simplification
specified earlier, we ignore any technician skill restraint,
hence, any technician can perform any repair. Second,
due to the proof-of-concept character of this study, we
assume all repair works to be of equal length. Third, we
do not take disruptions into account. Therefore, both,
travel and service duration times are deterministic which
results in a robust schedule. Fourth, we only
differentiate between three groups of customers having
different opportunity costs.

4.3 Design of the Pricing Function
For reasons of simplicity, we assume that pb = 1.0.
The pricing function for scenario A, representing simple
FCFS prioritization, is constant and set to 1.0.
Therefore, in scenario A, any time slot j is priced such
that pts,j = 1.0 and therefore does not vary. By doing so,
we assure that any customer books technician capacity
as early as possible, as prices remain fix—regardless of
the time of service—but opportunity costs, and with the
opportunity costs also the total costs increase over time.
Assuming complete information for designing the
pricing function for scenario B, the provider wants to
sell services to three customer segments: First, the
provider sells cheap capacity for customers having low
opportunity costs, and, second and third, selling average
and highly priced technician capacity to the customers
of the medium and high opportunity cost segments,
respectively. The services targeting the different
segments vary in their response time. Whereas short
response time services are usually priced at a high level
due to a low remaining technician capacity, long

response time services are much cheaper as they are
meant to be sold further ahead.
The time between the moment of booking and task
action differs for the three segments. High priority
customers will book shortly before the task action,
whereas low priority tasks will be booked earlier on.
Ideally, the provider wants to sell capacity to the
different segments according to their relative sizes (in
this case one third each). Anticipating the different time
lag between booking and service time of segments, the
provider sells capacity between 100% and 66% at a
price suitable for customers of the low opportunity cost
segment, capacity 66% and 33% at a price suitable for
customers of the medium opportunity cost segment, and
the final capacity is sold at a price suitable for customers
of the segment having high opportunity costs.
Setting pb = 1.0, the time slot prices in the simulation
model are calculated as shown below, with aj being the
slot availability.

𝑝"$,+

5; 0.00 ≤ 𝑎+ < 0.33
2; 0.30 ≤ 𝑎 < 0.66
=
1; 0.66 ≤ 𝑎+ ≤ 1.00
𝑐
with 𝑎+ = + 𝑐+,/01

By setting those prices, customers are in need to
determine when to book a required technician capacity.
Those prices will incentivize customers to book
technician capacity according to their segment. For
example, a customer from the low opportunity cost
segment will not book technician capacity at times
during which capacity is already rare. Instead, the
customer waits for the first capacity available that is
meant to be sold to the low opportunity cost segment.
Accordingly, a customer of the high opportunity
segment will always book technician capacity at the first
possible time slot available. If the customer waited
longer, the opportunity costs will increase
proportionally with the gain in lower service price.
Hence, by setting the prices according to the
opportunity costs, the provider incentivizes the desired
behavior of customers to self-signal which segment they
belong to and the desired task prioritization.

4.4 Experiment Results
For evaluation, we decide on using the following
performance indicator: First, we want to compare the
provider revenues of the two cases. Second, we are
interested in the response times for service requests of
the different customer segments. Third, we also want to
know whether technician utilization changes between
the two scenarios. Finally, we also log the overall sum
of opportunity costs. Table 3 shows the mean values of
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the simulation runs for those performance indicators for
scenarios A and B.
Table 3: Simulation Experiment Results
Performance
Indicator
Technician
Utilization
Revenue
Mean Response
Time (All Segments)
Mean Response
Time (LowSegment)
Mean Response
Time (MediumSegment)
Mean Response
Time (High
Segment)
Overall
Opportunity Costs

Scenario A
(FCFS, constant
price)

Scenario B
(Capacity-Based
Pricing)

86.00 %

85.99 %

64086 €

130543 €

14.06 hours

14.35 hours

14.10 hours

14.81 hours

13.92 hours

14.46 hours

14.15 hours

13.78 hours

718288.62 €

711308.81 €

Looking at the service provider’s revenue, we see a
drastic change between the two scenarios. In scenario B,
the service provider realizes twice as much revenue as
in scenario A. Of course, this must be seen with regards
to the different pricing function. Having seen the time
slot prices in the different scenarios it is no surprise that
revenue is doubled in scenario B. Alone the time slot
price for the final third technician capacity is 5 and
therefore five times higher than the time slot price in
scenario A. However, it is important to note that for both
scenarios the same WTP calculations were used, again,
demonstrating the effect of perished customer WTP.
Talking about service response times (the time
between the service request and the technician arriving
on-site) we note only minor, but yet important, changes.
First, the overall response time increases in scenario B
by around 0.3 hours (around 18 minutes) compared to
scenario A. Second, more interesting, however, are the
changes in the customer categories’ response times. In
scenario A, as formulated in the problem description,
there is no ordering according to the customer’s costs of
downtime. By chance, customers with the highest
opportunity costs are prioritized the lowest, indicated by
the highest response time. In the long run, however, the
response times of the three customer segments should
be equal. This deviation is caused by the characteristics
of a simulation model only testing individual cases. In
scenario B, the response times are ascending with
descending opportunity costs, therefore indicating the
desired results: Customers with high opportunity costs
are prioritized higher than those with low opportunity
costs. This behavior is explained by the usage of the

capacity-based pricing function. Customers of the high
segment are willing to pay a higher price for a service
and therefore receive an early response time, whereas
the WTP of customers of the low segment is too low to
book at peak times. Instead, they book technician
capacity at cheaper prices further ahead, therefore
resulting in a higher downtime cost. We do want to note
though that the response times did not change in “favor
of” all customers. Especially the customers with low
opportunity costs face higher response times in scenario
B than in scenario A while paying the same price for the
service. However, the observed effects in response times
are exactly the desired outcome and meet the second
research objective of task prioritization based on actual
(and not claimed) task urgency. The overall technician
utilization (sum of travel and repair times) does not
change between the two scenarios, as we did not change
the ratio of technicians and tasks but only the
prioritization (i.e. the ordering) of tasks. Finally, we also
see that the overall opportunity costs—the sum of all
opportunity costs—decreases by around one percent.
This is not much, but still, indicated that due to the shift
in task priority the overall opportunity costs are reduced.
Overall, the research objectives of first, using
pricing mechanisms to prioritize service tasks correctly,
and, second, increasing provider revenue, are met.
However, we also note that the overall response time
over all customers increased along with increased
service costs.

5 Future Challenges
The marketplace, as introduced above, faces the
following future challenges:
First, customers are in need for support tools to
estimate their required technician capacity correctly. In
the situation of a repair, for example, customers need to
determine the duration and skillset of technician
capacity required.
Second, providers must find a way of dealing with
wrongly booked technician capacity. For example, a
customer might believe that a repair takes two hours,
books capacity according to that, however, the repair
turns out to take three hours. This problem will occur
and needs to be dealt with. Intelligent machinery,
however, helps reducing those occurrences by providing
additional information.
Third, the question on proper reassignment needs to
be addressed. Even if the provider cannot change the
start and end times of a service, they can assign it to
other technicians and therefore optimize technician
routes.
Fourth, the identification of possible service times is
a highly interesting task. Providers must ask themselves
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the question how much flexibility they want to allow
when searching for possible service times. For example,
providers might anticipate reassignment already at the
point of service time proposition.
Fifth, the determination of a suitable pricing function
needs to be researched further. Future work, for
example, could investigate more advanced pricing
methods by using real-time data.

response times. Therefore, the desired effects of task
prioritization based on opportunity costs is achieved. In
addition, technician utilization remains constant at a
level of 86% whilst the second research objective, a
more efficient service pricing, is met. The provider’s
revenue is doubled by reducing the consumer surplus.

6. Conclusion and Future Work

The presented work has the following limitations:
First, due to the introduction of the novel approach,
many aspects are kept simple or are ignored and
therefore result in additional challenges to face. Those
aspects have already been mentioned in chapter five.
Second, following current trends, especially a finetuned pricing function using real-time data to determine
time slot prices is an extension to the presented model.
Third, we assumed that customers require an
immediate repair. However, there might be other
methods of assessing customer’s choice of service time.
Fourth, using an evaluation based on simulation, our
work is subject to common limitations of simulation
studies. For example, parameters are based on expert
interviews. In the future, simulation parameters should
be based on quantitative data.
Fifth, other pricing objectives might be worthwhile
considering. For example, providers might try to
maximize their revenue for repair tasks by auctioning
their capacity. This implies, however, that planning
happens just-in-time.
Sixth, this work is limited to corrective repair
strategies. We assumed that customers want their
equipment repaired as soon as possible. However,
emerging trends in maintenance (e.g. predictive
maintenance) might result in different scenarios. So far,
preventive services as well as periodic overhaul or
machine installation are not included in the proposed
marketplace model. Those additional services need to be
addressed in future work and represent an important
extension of the proposed model. When including those
services, it may be worthwhile to evaluate the
application of revenue management techniques. By
applying revenue management, providers can actively
steer service demand and therefore, for example,
incentivize optimized technician routes.

6.1 Contribution
The presented work proposes the implementation of
a technician marketplace that is used by industrial
maintenance customers to book technician capacity
when needed. In addition, we propose the application of
capacity-based pricing mechanism.
This work contributes to research in the field of
industrial maintenance. In detail, the following
contributions are made: First, the work identifies
inefficient pricing mechanism in industrial maintenance
and stresses problems in the prioritization of service
request in dispatching in practice. Second, a model on
estimating
industrial
maintenance
customer’s
willingness-to-pay (WTP) in case of a machine
breakdown is developed. Third, this work suggests the
implementation of a technician marketplace that is used
by customers to book technician capacity when needed.
Fourth, by applying capacity-based pricing, the
marketplace yields a solution that results in a higher
revenue for the provider, and, fifth, a transparent
approach of prioritizing service requests according to
their opportunity costs for the customer. Sixth, the
approach is evaluated using simulation.
For customers’ decision making, this work
introduces a model on estimating customers’ WTP for a
repair by assuming their rational decision making.
Customers minimizing their overall costs that are
calculated using service prices and costs of downtime.
The marketplace proposed offers customers to selfselect service times according to their WTP. Thus,
customers signal the true urgency of a service request.
Consequently, the service provider does not need to
prioritize tasks on subjective perception anymore.
The marketplace—evaluated by using three segment
of opportunity cost customers (high, medium, and low)
—and the newly introduced pricing mechanism result in
an overall longer response time of around 18 minutes
compared to simple first-come-first-service dispatching.
However, looking at customer segment’s response
times, we see that capacity-based pricing results in
customers with high opportunity costs having shorter,
and customer with low opportunity costs having longer

6.2 Limitations and Future Work
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